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“Without ASEAN there would have been no Cambodia 
issue. Because if we had not taken up the cause of 
Cambodia in early 1979, and steadfastly championed it, it 
would have disappeared.”   
 
Tommy Koh, former Singapore Ambassador to the United 
Nations   (Cited in Acharya, 2009a, pp. 95-96). 
 
Introduction  
The Third Indochina War began on 25 December 1978, when between 150,000 
and 220,000 Vietnamese troops invaded and occupied neighbouring Cambodia (Turley 
& Race, 1980, p. 92).1  Rooted in Sino-Soviet rivalry, the conflict was a spillover of the 
Cold War into Southeast Asia (Khoo, 2011).  Following the invasion, Vietnamese troops 
were involved in recurring cross-border operations in Thailand, which stopped short of 
an outright Vietnamese invasion.  In a bid to contain the Vietnamese threat, Thailand, in 
its role as a frontline or vanguard Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) state, 
formed an informal alliance with China, the Khmer Rouge, and to a lesser extent the 
United States (US). These actors provided active diplomatic and/or military support to 
Thailand, culminating in a major diplomatic and military success when Hanoi withdrew 
its forces from Cambodia in 1989.    
This Cold War era episode has direct relevance to the current debate on ASEAN’s 
record as a vehicle for defending regional sovereignty from external intervention. As 
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will be reviewed below, existing research has either over-emphasised or under-
emphasised ASEAN’s ability to defend regional sovereignty.  This article advances an 
alternative position, contending that ASEAN’s record is highly dependent on the stance 
of external actors whose interests align with the organisations’.  The specific question to 
which this article is concerned with is this: What was the basic cause of the success of 
ASEAN resistance to the Vietnamese challenge to ASEAN’s sovereignty from 1978-
1991?  This article contends that ASEAN’s success in this instance can best be explained 
by levels of interest convergence between the ASEAN vanguard state (Thailand) and a 
designated external actor, China (See Figure One).    
As the vanguard state, Thailand was able to set ASEAN’s agenda, garner great 
power security commitments, and forge a united ASEAN front for Thailand’s Vietnam 
policy.  While Thailand (in its capacity as the ASEAN vanguard state) clearly had an 
important role to play in this process, an equally important factor explaining ASEAN 
resistance to sovereignty violation during this time-period resides in the role played by 
external actors.  As will be explained more fully below, this view represents a serious 
challenge to much of the existing scholarship, which either over-emphasises or under-
emphasises ASEAN’s ability to defend regional autonomy from external intervention.   
Contending Explanations for ASEAN and Sovereignty Violation 
The existing regional literature regarding ASEAN’s record on sovereignty 
violation is polarised.  An influential group of constructivist theorists advocate a 
perspective emphasising ASEAN’s autonomy and ability to uphold regional order 
despite challenges (Acharya 2009a; Acharya 2009b; Acharya 2012; Ba 2009; Haacke 
2003).  A second approach views regional intervention in terms of its relationship to 
social forces within ASEAN states (Jones, 2012).  Leifer (1979, 1989) and Jones and 
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Smith (2002, 2006, 2007a, 2007b), represent a third perspective, emphasising ASEAN’s 
lack of autonomy and reliance on external actors’ sufferance.  This article adopts a 
middle ground in respect to this literature.  In the process, it will advance a distinctive 
realist perspective of ASEAN’s record. 
Constructivist Theory 
The consensus among constructivists studying ASEAN is that the organisation’s 
governing norms emphasise dialogue, consensus-building and non-confrontation.  
According to Amitav Acharya (2009a, p. 4), norms have a transformative impact.  Norms 
regulate state behaviour, redefine state interests, and constitute state identities 
(Acharya, 2009a, p. 4).  For Jürgen Haacke (2003, p. 2), norms also help mediate ASEAN 
leaders’ insecurity.  For Alice Ba, ideas are the primary focus.  Regionalism in Southeast 
Asia is viewed as part of an interactive process, where ideas play a key role in shaping 
expectations and behaviour (Ba, 2009, p. 4).   
In this literature, there is significant emphasis on ASEAN autonomy, and 
‘regional solutions for regional problems, with minimal intervention by outside powers’ 
(Acharya, 2009a, p. 101).  Indeed, the norm of non-interference is enshrined in Article 
2c of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).  It is stated there 
that ‘in their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided 
by…non-interference in the internal affairs of one another’ (Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, 1976).  Seeking to transcend the role of the nation state by emphasising 
the role of ‘regionalism’ (Acharya, 2012, p. 3), it is believed that regional cooperation 
can play a central role in shaping modern Southeast Asian identity (Acharya, 2012, p. 1).   
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What happens when the organisation’s norms, ideas and regional identity are 
challenged? Constructivist theorists interpret the Third Indochina War as a challenge to 
ASEAN norms, cohesion and unity (Acharya, 2009a, p. 116; Ba, 2009, p. 85; Haacke, 
2003, p. 111).  As Ba states, ‘Vietnam’s action clearly challenged the idea of a unified and 
resilient Southeast Asia’ (Ba, 2009, p. 86), while Thailand’s subsequent alliance 
relationship with China ‘represented a real test of the regional autonomy goals’ (Ba, 
2009, p. 86).  However, she maintains that ‘shared ideas of region and the importance of 
regional unity might…have been the only [italics in text] significant thing that kept them 
working together toward a common solution’ (Ba, 2009, p. 87).  In this view, ideas about 
Southeast Asia’s ‘division and foreign intervention’ find expression in ‘ideas of resilience 
and “One Southeast Asia”’ (Ba, 2009, p. 29).  At face value, this clearly over-estimates the 
role of ideas, and neglects a host of other factors, including regional security concerns, 
and the role of external powers emphasised in standard accounts of this period of 
Southeast Asia’s history (Weatherbee, 2005, pp. 75-87).     
Other constructivists also maintain that the Third Indochina War was a stellar 
success for ASEAN, which emerged from the conflict strengthened in its mission and 
core norms.  According to Acharya, ASEAN ‘presented the Vietnamese invasion as a 
gross violation of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states as 
well as the principle of non-use of force’ (Acharya, 2009a, p. 116).  As events developed, 
the conflict gave ‘a more substantive meaning to ASEAN political and security 
cooperation’ (Acharya, 2012, p. 195), whilst also having ‘positive effects for ASEAN’s 
pursuit of a regional identity’ (Acharya, 2009a, p. 116). Our point here is not to deny 
that there was a record of ASEAN co-operation, but to emphasise that it has been 
misinterpreted. To be specific, the role of ASEAN has been elevated, while that of 
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external powers’ has been systematically downplayed, with important theoretical 
consequences.  Indeed, Jürgen Haacke, a constructivist who has studied ASEAN’s 
diplomacy in the Third Indochina War, reaches a very different conclusion to Acharya, 
noting that ‘ultimately, however, all of ASEAN had to bow to the pressure of major 
powers and accept the political compromise’ that was presented as a fait accompli 
(Haacke, 2003, p.111).   
Critical Theory  
 Critical theorist Lee Jones advances a second perspective of ASEAN sovereignty 
that centres on the domestic politics of the various ASEAN states.  Jones (2012, p. 15) 
seeks to identify the forces that benefit from particular sovereignty regimes.  In this 
view, sovereignty is conceptualised as a ‘technology of power’ (Jones, 2012, p. 14).  
Patterns of sovereignty are explained with reference ‘to the strategies used by state 
managers to advance particular societal interests and ideologies over others’ (Jones, 
2012, p. 29).  Because sovereignty regimes are ‘closely implicated in the state-making 
process’, they are likely be challenged, both externally and by internal social forces 
(Jones, 2012, p. 29).  What therefore emerges is ‘the contingent outcome of a struggle 
between all these forces, which must be considered as dynamic, evolving and often 
interrelated’ (Jones, 2012, p. 29). 
For Jones, ASEAN responded to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia ‘not to defend its 
non-interference principle, but rather to contain revolution in Indochina’ (2012, p. 76).  
To this end, the ASEAN states ‘engaged in counter-intervention, fomenting civil war 
inside Cambodia to keep Vietnamese forces pinned down and unable to support 
revolutionary movements outside Indochina’ (Jones, 2012, p. 76).  The Vietnamese 
threat is ‘not understood in conventional, military, balance-of-power terms’ but in terms 
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of ‘the likely consequences of the invasion for the balance of forces within their own 
societies’ (Jones, 2012, p. 78).  Jones focuses a disproportionate amount of his narrative 
on ASEAN’s opposition to the spread of revolution for domestic political reasons.  As 
such, his approach fails to consider a variety of other critical factors including: ASEAN’s 
position in the Cold War regional environment, ASEAN state external security concerns, 
and the external reasons for collaboration between ASEAN states and the great powers 
(Weatherbee, 2005, pp. 75-87).  Jones makes no mention of the role of the Soviet Union, 
and fails to consider the shared mutual security interests between Thailand and China.  
Jones also deemphasises legitimate and real fears of Vietnamese expansion on the part 
of ASEAN states.  Taken together, these limitations undermine Jones’ argument.        
Realist Theory 
A third strand in the literature is represented by the standard realist perspective. 
If the constructivist literature has over-emphasised ASEAN’s ability to resist sovereignty 
violations, then this strand in the literature sees little agency for ASEAN in regional 
affairs. Michael Leifer, David Martin Jones and Michael LR Smith contend that ASEAN’s 
preference for consensus and conflict avoidance has lent itself to extra-regional actors 
manipulating ASEAN norms to serve their own best interests (Jones & Smith, 2007a, p. 
150). According to Leifer, for Thailand, an alliance with China and the Khmer Rouge 
represented a ‘much more effective means by which to challenge Vietnam’s hegemonic 
position than the diplomatic support of ASEAN’ (Leifer, 1989, p. 97).  In this view, the 
position ‘adopted by the Association favoured China’s interests, above all’ (Leifer, 1989, 
p. 98).   
While Leifer does pay some consideration to the ‘differential impact on the actual 
security interests’ of the ASEAN member states, these are relatively ineffective (Leifer, 
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1989, p. 90).  Thus, alternative approaches to resolving the problem of Vietnam’s 
invasion are interpreted as arising ‘from a natural divergence of strategic perspectives, 
which has been an important factor in denying the Association a conventional security 
role’ (Leifer, 1989, p. 90).  The critical point to note is that Leifer does not seek to 
develop a connection between external power and regional state interests.  As such, 
ASEAN state interests remain hostage to those of China, and regional autonomy remains 
wholly reliant on external actors.   
Jones and Smith also minimise ASEAN’s role in the resolution of the Third 
Indochina War, maintaining that the eventual settlement ‘represented an archetypal 
manifestation of great power politics’ (Jones & Smith, 2006, p. 55).  According to this 
view, ‘ASEAN’s actual contribution to the Cambodian settlement reveals its role to be 
both ambiguous and ultimately limited’ (Jones & Smith, 2006, p. 54).  The Association 
only appeared effective ‘because its actions coincided with superpower interests’, with 
ASEAN acting as ‘a convenient front for external actors and interests’ (Jones & Smith, 
2006, p. 55).  For Jones and Smith, the fact that China and the Soviet Union effectively 
resolved the conflict through bilateral diplomacy, illustrated ‘the region’s continuing 
dependence upon external actors and the illusory character of ASEAN’s attempt to erect 
a cordon sanitaire around Southeast Asia’ (Jones and Smith, 2006, p. 55).   
To be clear, Jones and Smith offer a strong counter-argument to constructivist 
theorising.  Their assessments of the role of great powers in Indochina during the Cold 
War, add significant weight to their realist-based claims.  However, as with Leifer, they 
take an overly restrictive view of ASEAN autonomy and the role of ASEAN states.  As I 
will attempt to show, they are unable to adequately explain examples of state 
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cooperation and consensus, as evident during periods of the Third Indochina War.  This 
is an important limitation in their analysis, which I seek to rectify. 
Defining Realist State Interests and Sovereignty 
In advancing an alternative account in the literature, the critical independent 
variable in our analysis is the degree of convergence in state interests between an 
ASEAN vanguard state and a specific external actor or actors.  Consistent with a realist 
theoretical approach, we draw on a realist understanding of how interests are defined. 
Following the work of Stephen Krasner (1978, p. 12), analysis begins with, and 
ultimately attempts to defend, the basic premise underlying what has become known as 
the state-centric realist paradigm.  In this view, states can be treated as unified actors 
pursuing aims understood in terms of the national interest (Krasner, 1978, p. 12).   
Interests enjoy a strong tradition within the realist literature, where there exists 
a consistent view of the basic state interest, which is state survival.  For example, 
neorealist Kenneth Waltz believes that ‘by comparing nations and corporations, the 
elusive notion of national interest is made clear.  By assumption, economic actors seek 
to maximise expected returns, and states strive to secure their survival’ (1979, p. 134).  
John Mearsheimer reaffirms this view, stating that ‘survival is the primary goal of great 
powers’ (2001, p. 31).  When a state must act to ensure its survival, this constrains a 
state’s consideration of broader interests (Zakaria, 1998, p. 186).  However, during 
periods of relative peace, ‘powers have the “luxury” of choosing their interests and 
goals’ (Zakaria, 1998, p. 186).  During such times, a range of other values will be sought, 
including ‘rank, respect, material possessions and material privileges’ (Wolfers, 1952, p. 
489).  Interest based inter-state cooperation may be based on a response to threats 
(Walt, 1987), or for the pursuit of gains (Grieco, 1988).   
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Our dependent variable focuses on resistance to sovereignty violations. 
Sovereignty is understood in terms of the Westphalian model, defined as an 
‘institutional arrangement for organising political life that is based on two principles: 
territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures’ 
(Krasner, 1999, p. 20).  Westphalian sovereignty can be violated through intervention, 
where more powerful states coerce ‘public authorities in weaker states to accept 
externally dictated authority structures’ (Krasner, 1999, p. 8).  For many, the principle 
of non-intervention, which is always violated through coercion or imposition, is the key 
element of sovereign statehood (Krasner, 1999, p. 20).  Interventions occur when there 
is an asymmetry of power (Krasner, 1995, p. 229).  Because powerful states intervene in 
the internal affairs of less powerful states (Krasner, 1995, p. 229), weaker states have 
always been the ‘strongest supporters’ of the rule of non-intervention (Krasner, 1999, p. 
21).  Weaker states will always seek to resist violations to their sovereignty.  It is our 
contention that they are able to do so when their interests converge with that of an 
external actor.   
An understanding of the foregoing literature leads us to conceptualise our 
variables in a particular way.  For the purposes of analysis, this study begins with the 
basic assumption that state interests are premised on seeking survival.  Building on the 
works of Timothy Crawford (2003, pp. 30-31) and Daryl Press (2005, pp. 25-28), a 
continuous variable has been constructed representing the state interests at stake, with 
vital interests at one end and secondary interests at the other.  Crawford (2003, p. 31) 
defines vital interests as involving ‘self-preservation, political independence, and, by 
extension, defence of strategically vital areas’.  Similarly, Press (2005, p. 26) defines 
vital interests as preservation of ‘sovereignty’.  Secondary threats can vary greatly, and 
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may range ‘from very important interests, such as maintaining trade routes, the safety 
of your allies, and even national “prestige”, to much more ephemeral ones’ (Crawford, 
2003, p. 31). Whilst ranking the hierarchy of state interests is inherently difficult, 
ultimately, interests pertaining to national self-preservation logically must take 
precedence (Crawford, 2003, p. 31).   
Interest convergence is measured by identifying symmetric or asymmetric 
interests (Ross, 2002, pp. 48-85), whether vital or secondary (as defined by Crawford), 
and arrangements for cooperation between states.  Interest convergence is a dynamic 
process, where small states actively seek ‘maximum great-power commitment to their 
security interests while trying to minimise the price of obtaining that support’ 
(Ciorciari, 2010, p. 2).  They do so because they ‘generally lack formidable independent 
power capabilities’ and, as such, ‘cannot affect the international security landscape on 
their own’ (Ciorciari, 2010, p. 1).  However, because some small states ‘occupy strategic 
positions’, they can ‘affect the overall global distribution of power by adding to the 
resources of some great powers and constraining others’ (Ciorciari, 2010, p. 1).  
Engaging with this literature, our analysis begins with the underlying premise 
that the study of interest convergence can yield utility to the field of Southeast Asian 
international relations.  As a small collection of regional states, ASEAN has little impact 
on the international security landscape. This view of ASEAN autonomy is consistent 
with existing realist literature of Leifer (1989) and Jones and Smith (2006).  However, 
this article contributes to the literature by demonstrating that when a clear interest 
convergence occurs between an ASEAN state and an external power, a substantial 
compact is constructed.  In short, an ASEAN vanguard state plays the important and 
necessary function of actively seeking and supporting a great power intervention in 
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regional affairs, which are consistent with the interests of both the ASEAN state and the 
external actor.  By doing so, an ASEAN vanguard state has an active and substantial role 
in resisting sovereignty violations from other external powers.  Great powers will use 
regional institutions to pursue their own interests (Schweller and Priess, 1997, p. 12).  
However, when vital interests are at stake, regional states will seek to do the same.   
Theoretical Assessment of the Third Indochina War (1978-1991)  
 To test the hypothesis that following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978, an 
increase in interest convergence between an ASEAN vanguard state and designated 
external actor caused an increase in ASEAN vanguard state success of resistance to 
sovereignty violation, we must consider the regional environment of Southeast Asia 
during that period.  
 The Regional Environment 1975-1978 
 In 1975, communist power was consolidated in three Southeast Asian countries: 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.  Following victory over the United States, North Vietnam 
lost little time attempting to secure a number of objectives.  First, and most importantly, 
it sought to enhance its regional security.  Vietnamese strategists argued that if a power 
hostile to Vietnam established a close relationship with either Cambodia or Laos, that 
association would seriously threaten Vietnam’s security (Chanda, 1986, p. 94).  Of 
secondary importance was the realisation of a long held desire to establish its own 
sphere of influence in Indochina.  Since the 1930s, the Vietnamese believed a Federation 
of Indochina, including Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, was the proper configuration for 
the Indochina region (Pike, 1979, p. 30).  In 1977, Vietnam secured a twenty-five year 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Laos. This was an unambiguous declaration 
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that Laos clearly fell under Vietnam’s sphere of influence (Khoo, 2011, p. 115).  Vietnam 
had more difficulty establishing a sphere of influence over Cambodia.  The increasingly 
anti-Vietnamese and pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge had seized power in neighbouring 
Cambodia in April 1975 (Chanda, 1986, p. 5).  This presented Vietnam with the reality of 
a hostile regime right at its border. 
Tensions grew between Cambodia and Vietnam throughout the period 1975-
1978.  Within Cambodia, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge embarked on a brutal crackdown, 
which included forced labour, starvation and mass genocide.  Even the Khmer cadres 
were subject to large-scale killings and routine purges (Chanda, 1986, pp. 83-84).  The 
Khmer Rouge had long been wary of Vietnamese regional ambitions.  Their aim was ‘to 
blunt Vietnamese expansionism, pre-empt Hanoi’s effort to exert influence over Phnom 
Penh, and reclaim soil that, in the Cambodian view of history, properly belonged in the 
hands of the Khmer’ (O’Dowd, 2007, p. 33).  With these aims in mind, the Khmer Rouge 
sought to eliminate all Vietnamese influence within Cambodia, and to implement anti-
Vietnamese policies (Pike, 1979, p, 31).  Cambodia declared a cessation in diplomatic 
relations with Vietnam on 31 December 1977 (Leifer, 1979, p. 249).  This was 
interpreted by the Vietnamese as ‘the creation of a “bridgehead of aggression” on behalf 
of the Chinese’, who had ‘used the reactionary and genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary fascist 
gang to make war, nibbling at the south-western border of our homeland hoping to 
squeeze us in a vice’ (Leifer, 1979, p. 249).  A hostile Cambodia posed a serious threat to 
Vietnamese security. 
Chinese State Interests 
China, which perceived a unified Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union, to be a 
major regional threat, increasingly believed that the two were engaged in a strategy of 
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Chinese encirclement (Ross, 1991, p. 1171).  Enhanced Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation 
increasingly led to a further deterioration in both the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese 
relationships (Khoo, 2011, p. 55).  Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua informed US 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in 1978 that Vietnam’s ‘objective is regional hegemony, 
and it has hired itself out to the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union had exploited the 
ambitions of Vietnam to realise its aggression’ (U.S. Department of State, 2013, doc. 
138).  Aiming to counter the Soviet-Vietnamese encirclement strategy, China provided 
military and economic aid to Cambodia to support its fight against Vietnamese 
expansion.  A November 1978 US Interagency Intelligence Memorandum found that 
China ‘considers an independent Kampuchea allied with Peking an essential buffer 
against the expansion of Vietnamese, and by extension Soviet, influence in the area’ (U.S. 
Department of State, 2013, doc. 152).   
At the same time, China sought to act as a moderating influence on the Khmer 
Rouge.  Concerned that the abuse of human rights by the Pol Pot regime would alienate 
international support, China attempted to point the regime ‘in the direction of a more 
traditional realpolitik foreign policy’ (Morris, 1999, pp. 85-86).  China also mediated a 
1975 agreement to establish relations between Thailand and Cambodia, with the 
purpose of ‘creating a ‘united front’ against Hanoi expansionism’ (Chambers, 2005, pp. 
609-610).  It was of vital Chinese interest that the Soviet Union, and by extension 
Vietnam, be prevented from extending their influence into Southeast Asia.  China’s 
regional primacy and territorial security were at stake.   
Regional State Interests 
ASEAN, Vietnam and the Soviet Union 
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ASEAN state reactions to Vietnamese communist consolidation of power in 
Southeast Asia were polarised, reflecting a variety of state interests.  Of the ASEAN 
states, most alarm was felt in Thailand, ‘the country closest to the epicentre of political 
and military turmoil’ (Ang, 2013, p. 7).  Vietnamese communist victory ‘brought the 
least response from the country furthest away, Indonesia’ (Ang, 2013, p. 7).  Seeking 
enhanced security and potential economic aid, Vietnam made diplomatic overtures to 
the ASEAN states after its reunification in 1975.  However, it refused to deal with ASEAN 
as an Association.  This was largely due to the Vietnamese perception of ASEAN during 
the Second Indochina War, when ASEAN ‘was venomously flayed as a de facto military 
alliance’ (Buszynski, 1981, p. 540).  Vietnam’s attempts to normalise relations with the 
ASEAN states were ultimately ‘subject to the suspicions and animosities that had been 
fuelled by the Vietnam War’ (Buszynski, 1986, p. 116).  Vietnam made another bid to 
woo the ASEAN states in August and September of 1978, at a time of increased Sino-
Vietnamese conflict.  Vietnamese overtures were much to China’s displeasure, who 
warned ‘ASEAN against Soviet attempts at infiltration and expansion’ (Chanda, 1986, p. 
36).  The ASEAN states decided against rushing into a formal agreement with Vietnam at 
that time (Chanda, 1986, p. 319).   
The Soviet Union had been attempting to extend its influence in Southeast Asia 
since 1969, when it had advanced the idea of an Asian collective security system.  The 
ostensible aim of this proposal was to ‘demonstrate Soviet solicitude for the security of 
Asian states’ (Buszynski, 1986, p. 67).  However, the collective security system struggled 
to get off the ground.  This was largely due to the regional belief that the concept was an 
anti-China move, which might ultimately provoke Beijing (Buszynski, 1981, pp. 536-
537).  The Soviet Union revived the notion following Vietnamese communist success in 
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the Vietnam War.  Soviet leaders ‘anticipated that the announcement of American 
withdrawal from Indochina in the context of expanded Chinese influence within the 
region would work in their favour’ (Buszynski, 1986, p. 69).  Whilst some ASEAN states 
did move to enhance diplomatic relations with the Soviets, this did not result in any 
formal alliances.  The ASEAN states, warned by China that Moscow’s collective security 
proposal aimed to promote its ‘hegemonic aspirations’ (Ross, 1988, p. 111), remained 
wary of drawing Soviet influence into the region.  
Thailand and Singapore  
Responding to the threat posed by a unified Vietnam, Thailand and Singapore 
sought external power security guarantees.  In a 1975 conversation between 
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 
Lee stated his belief that ‘Hanoi may see this as a moment of destiny.  They may want a 
master-servant situation with Cambodia and Laos and put pressure on the Thais’ (U.S. 
Department of State, 2011, doc. 297).  In April 1975, Prime Minister Lee met with a Thai 
delegation in Bangkok, which included the Thai Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot and 
Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunawan.  During this meeting, Lee informed Chatchai that 
he viewed Thailand to potentially be ‘the next domino’ in Southeast Asia (Wikileaks, 
1975, BANGKO074125_b). As a result, he argued, it was vital that they maintain a US 
presence in order to resist communist incursions (Wikileaks, 1975, BANGKO074125_b).   
In a 1975 meeting between Chatchai and Kissinger, Kissinger stated the US 
preference that Cambodia remain: 
Independent as a counterweight to North Vietnam…we would prefer to have 
Laos and Cambodia aligned with China rather than with North Vietnam.  We 
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would try to encourage this if that is what you want…you should also tell the 
Cambodians that we will be friends with them.  They are murderous thugs, but 
we won’t let that stand in our way’ (National Security Archive, 1975, doc. 17).   
Chatchai informed Kissinger that ‘yes, we would like you to do that…the Chinese are 100 
percent in support of Cambodia’s being friends with Thailand’ (National Security 
Archive, 1975, doc. 17).  In an October 1975 meeting with Japanese officials in Tokyo, 
Chatchai made it clear that the situation in Indochina was ‘very dangerous’ for Thailand, 
and that Hanoi was the major threat (Wikileaks Cable, 1975, 1975TOKYO14290_b).  
Japanese officials believed Chatchai implied a ‘linked PRC [People’s Republic of China], 
Cambodia and Thailand in [a] quasi-alliance’ (Wikileaks Cable, 1975, 
1975TOKYO14290_b).  For both Thailand and Singapore, Vietnam represented a clear 
threat to regional security.  
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines  
Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, took a different approach to the 
unification of Vietnam.  In line with their own state interests, these states largely sought 
a regional approach to any threat posed, preferring to limit the role of external powers 
in the region.  Although Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines took steps to establish 
diplomatic relations with China in 1975, Indonesia was not happy with Beijing’s attempt 
to ‘woo’ ASEAN countries, or the ‘current “panicky rush” of ASEAN countries to Beijing’ 
(Sukma, 1999, p. 94).  In April 1975, Indonesian Minister of Defence General 
Panggabean met with US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Brown to discuss 
Vietnam.  Panggabean confirmed the Indonesian view that ‘naturally [the] prospect of 
communist takeover in Indochina creates a very real concern in Indonesia.  Indonesians 
hoped, however, and were inclined to believe, that communists in Indochina were as 
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much nationalists as communists.  If this was [the] case, relations with them over longer 
term would be possible’ (Wikileaks, 1975, 1975JAKART04135_b).   
Similarly, acting Malaysian Prime Minister Ghafar Baba stated the Malaysian 
hope that ‘both the new governments in Cambodia and South Vietnam would cooperate 
with ASEAN countries in maintaining political and economic stability in this region.  
Whether (they) follow the democratic system of governments as Malaysians know it is 
their affair’ (Wikileaks, 1975, 1975KUALA02386_b).  The Philippines’ President Marcos, 
aware that his country was geographically removed from any threat and home to a 
number of US bases, remained ‘firm in his expressions that the US-Philippine security 
relationship is essential to his country’ (U.S. Department of State, 2011, doc. 16).  These 
differing state interests prevented any unified ASEAN response to the consolidation of 
communist power in Indochina.  Instead, ‘much of the initiative towards 
accommodation with the emerging realities of the power structure in the region was 
effectively in the hands of individual member states rather than in ASEAN as a regional 
grouping’ (Nair, 1984, pp. 57-59). 
The Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia (1978) 
 By 1978, Vietnam’s domestic situation was in disarray.  Unable to receive aid 
from countries such as the US and China, Vietnam was driven further into the arms of 
the Soviet Union.  Vietnam joined COMECON, a Moscow based economic arrangement, 
in August 1978 (Pike, 1979, p. 33). Two months later, on 2 November 1978, it agreed to 
sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow.  This resulted in a massive 
shipment of Soviet military hardware to Vietnam (Pike, 1979, p. 33).  A closer 
relationship with the Soviet Union provided economic and military aid, as well as 
security assurances against an increasingly aggressive China.  However, the increase in 
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Soviet-Vietnamese relations led to a further deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations 
(Khoo, 2011).  China viewed the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance as a direct threat.  It 
responded with increased support to Cambodia, a diplomatic effort to strengthen 
regional relations, and an interest in early normalisation of diplomatic relations with 
the United States (Ross, 1988, p. 219).   
Of particular importance to China were close ties with Thailand.  In Beijing’s 
view, Thailand, in conjunction with Cambodia, could help China in a Vietnamese 
containment strategy (Khoo, 2011, p. 127).  Two days after Vietnam signed the 
friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, Chinese Vice premier Deng Xiaoping travelled 
to Bangkok to seek more formal security cooperation.  Deng assured Thai Prime 
Minister Kriangsak Chamanan that Beijing would end its support for the Communist 
Party of Thailand (CPT) and would punish Hanoi for its hegemonic behaviour.  Deng 
stated that Thailand’s security mattered to Beijing, as did the stability of Southeast Asia, 
and that China would help enhance Thai security against the Vietnamese threat 
(Chambers, 2005, p. 613).  Kriangsak did not immediately agree to a formal alliance, 
although the meeting was a step closer to enhanced relations between the two. 
 Having signed a formal treaty with the Soviet Union, Vietnam was now in a 
stronger position to take action against Cambodia.  Apart from Cambodia’s close 
physical proximity to Vietnam, Cambodia’s relationship with China allowed an external 
power increased presence in Indochina.  Seeking to put a halt to this process, the 
Vietnamese decided to attack the Khmer Rouge.  On 25 December 1978, the first phase 
of the assault commenced, when between 150,000 and 220,000 Vietnamese troops 
invaded neighbouring Cambodia (Turley & Race, 1980, p. 92).  On the 7 January, Pol Pot 
was driven from Phnom Penh by Vietnamese troops, supported by some 20,000 
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dissident Cambodians (Funston, 1979, p. 268). On the 8 January, a Vietnamese puppet 
government was installed headed by Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge commander 
who had defected to Vietnam.  Approximately 20-40,000 Khmer Rouge troops survived 
the invasion.  These troops withdrew into the jungle, where they could commence 
guerrilla operations against the Vietnamese forces (Funston, 1979, p. 268).  
Initial Responses to the Invasion  
ASEAN and China: Official Responses 
On 7 January, the Chinese government transmitted a statement to the United 
Nations (UN), stating that ‘Viet Nam had invaded Democratic Kampuchea, was 
occupying a large part of the country and, with USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics] support, intended to annex Kampuchea by force and set up an “Indochinese 
Federation” under its control’ (The United Nations, 1979, p. 272).  On 9 January, the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister issued a statement as chairman of the ASEAN Standing 
Committee on the escalation of the armed conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia.  In 
the statement, the ASEAN member countries stated that they ‘deeply deplore the 
current escalation and enlargement of the conflict between the two states in 
Indochina…they call upon all countries in the region to strictly, respect each other’s 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and political system’ (ASEAN Standing 
Committee, 1979).  This was followed on the 12 January with a joint statement issued 
by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers stating that the ministers ‘strongly deplored the armed 
intervention against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Kampuchea…[and] called for the immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces 
from Kampuchean territory’ (ASEAN Foreign Ministers, 1979).   
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ASEAN State Concerns 
Clearly, ASEAN was greatly concerned by Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia.  The 
Soviet-Vietnamese alliance ‘seriously shook ASEAN confidence about Vietnam’s claim to 
be an independent and nonaligned nation’ (Chanda, 1986, p. 325).  Vietnamese 
overtures towards ASEAN in 1978 were viewed as a ‘duplicitous stratagem’, and a 
‘manoeuvre to soften them as part of Vietnam’s preparations to invade Cambodia’ 
(Turley & Race, 1980, p. 102, p. 98).  The invasion also coloured regional views of the 
Soviet Union.  The ASEAN states had attempted to limit Soviet influence in the region, as 
can be seen in the Soviet’s failed collective security proposal.  Following Vietnam’s 
invasion, the ASEAN states believed ‘Moscow had attempted to gain illegitimate entry 
into the region in disregard of the ASEAN desire to remove the basis for great power 
intervention of this kind’ (Buszynski, 1981, p. 541).   
Deng Xiaoping succinctly expressed Chinese and Southeast Asian state fears 
regarding Vietnam and the Soviet Union in a meeting with US President Jimmy Carter in 
a meeting on 29 January 1979.  During this meeting, Deng informed Carter that China 
found ‘that Vietnam has become totally Soviet controlled…at least a majority of ASEAN 
countries assess this as an extremely grave matter…ASEAN countries are now in the 
front line’ (U.S. Department of State, 2013, doc. 205).  Carter informed Deng that the US 
‘are encouraging the ASEAN countries to stand united against Vietnam, and we are 
increasing military aid to Thailand. We have also warned the Soviet Union in strong 
terms about the damage to their relations with us if they pursue their aggression 
against Cambodia’ (U.S. Department of State, 2013, doc. 205). Deng agreed with this 
approach, stating that: 
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At least a majority of ASEAN countries assesses this an (sic) extremely grave 
matter. Not long ago I visited Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. At that time, 
they believed Hanoi’s promises. But when Vietnam attacked Cambodia, they 
realised they had been taken in. At the same time, they expressed the hope that 
China will be able to do something. Some friends even criticised China for being 
too soft. Thus ASEAN countries are now in the front line’ (U.S. Department of 
State, 2013, doc. 205).   
Sino-Vietnamese Border War (1979) 
Deng informed Carter of the Chinese plan to launch a punitive strike against 
Vietnam.  Deng stated that the ‘Vietnamese now are extremely arrogant…we consider it 
necessary to put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them 
an appropriate limited lesson…the lesson will be limited to a short period of time…If our 
action in the South is quickly completed, they won’t have time to react…we need your 
[the US] moral support in the international field’ (U.S. Department of State, 2013, doc. 
205).  China labelled the strike a ‘self-defensive counterattack’, in order to reduce any 
domestic or international negative reactions (Zhang, 2005, p. 860).   
Before the invasion, Deng set out to woo the ASEAN countries, embarking on a 
nine-day tour through Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, tasked with assuring ‘these 
countries of China’s benevolent role as guardian of regional security and to enlist their 
support in the confrontation with Vietnam’ (Chanda, 1986, p. 324).  The ensuing border 
war with Vietnam was fought in three stages, beginning on 17 February, and ending 
with a complete withdrawal on 16 March (Zhang, 2005, p. 863).  China claimed the 
attack to be a victory.  Catching Hanoi off-guard, it forced the Vietnamese to expend 
resources preparing for a second attack, whilst having to maintain a large portion of its 
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army at the Sino-Vietnamese border, thus preventing those troops from being deployed 
in Cambodia (Morris, 1999, p. 221). 
External Power Interest Convergence  
The Sino-Thai Alliance 
On 14 January, members of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) flew to 
meet with Thai premier Kriangsak to discuss Sino-Thai cooperation following the 
invasion of Cambodia.  It was at this meeting of military leaders that ‘a foundation of de 
facto Sino-Thai alliance was laid’ (Chanda, 1986, pp. 348-9).  Kriangsak is reported to 
have given Thai consent to allow Chinese use of Thai territory to support the Khmer 
guerrillas, a crucial element in China’s ‘bleed Vietnam white’ strategy (Chambers, 2005, 
p. 614).  In return for the use of this territory, Beijing agreed to terminate its support for 
the CPT (Turley & Race, 1980, p. 107).  Thailand’s security was greatly enhanced by the 
alliance.  Upon reporting Vietnamese artillery shelling or attacks on the Thai border, the 
Thais could ‘expect that within six hours, the Chinese troops on the Sino-Vietnamese 
border would repay the Vietnamese in kind’ (Chambers, 2005, p. 616).   
This informal security alliance had a core purpose that satisfied both Chinese 
and Thai interests: ‘to balance against the Vietnamese threat to the region’ (Chambers, 
2005, p. 602).  A US telegram from the Embassy in China to the US Department of State 
confirmed this relationship, stating that ‘Beijing’s strategy is heavily reliant on Thai 
cooperation…if the Vietnamese spill over into Thailand, the risk of a major PRC military 
strike against Vietnam will be commensurately greater’ (U.S. Department of State, 2013, 
doc. 275).  China viewed Thailand as a front-line state in the fight against Vietnamese 
expansion.  In a July 1979 meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua and US 
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National Security Council Staff members Nicholas Platt and Richard Holbrooke, Hua 
‘stressed the threat to Thailand, where seven Vietnamese divisions are poised on the 
border. If Thailand goes, “the rest of ASEAN will fall like dominoes” (U.S. Department of 
State, 2013, doc. 252). 
The United States 
In an August 1979 meeting between US Vice President Walter Mondale and 
Chinese Vice Premier Deng, the situation in Indochina was discussed in detail.  Mondale 
informed Deng that ‘in Indochina, we share the same objectives: to protect Thailand and 
other ASEAN states, and to show Vietnam that its increasing dependence upon Moscow 
will hurt badly over time and should be abandoned…the US stands ready to work 
closely with China and with ASEAN in making progress to this end’ (U.S. Department of 
State, 2013, doc. 265).  Mondale informed Deng that the US had: 
Placed major emphasis on the closest consultation with ASEAN countries 
including improved security assistance to Thailand, more modern planes, more 
economic assistance and military assistance. I personally travelled to Bangkok to 
reaffirm the Manila Pact. I went to the Philippines to get the long-stalled 
negotiations on Subic Bay extended on a permanent basis…this relationship with 
ASEAN has been a crucial part in the process of increasing stability in the ASEAN 
and Pacific region’ (U.S. Department of State, 2013, doc. 265).  
Deng agreed with Mondale’s support for the ASEAN states, claiming that the ‘ASEAN 
countries particularly Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines have expressed their 
apprehension that the Vietnamese may attack them, and I told them in the event of an 
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attack against the ASEAN countries, we will stand on their side. And I told them that we 
mean what we say’ (U.S. Department of State, 2013, doc. 265). 
In the 1980s, China provided Thailand with heavy artillery guns, anti-aircraft and 
anti-tank guns as well as battle tanks, with the purpose of enhancing Thai military 
capabilities (Chambers, 2005, p. 616).  In a July 1980 meeting between President Carter 
and Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua (U.S. Department of State, 2013, doc. 313), 
Carter informed his Chinese counterpart that the US ‘had expedited shipment by air to 
Thailand of some weapons they had ordered’. Huang stated that ‘it was important to 
support Thailand, and that the PRC appreciated what the US had done’.  China was 
making ‘every effort to assist the Thais, including shipments of “natural resources”’.  
China was also ‘taking pressure off Thailand by tying down 29 SRV [Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam] infantry divisions along the Sino-Vietnamese border’. As an added 
element of security, Hua had informed ‘the Thais that the PRC would “side with them” if 
Vietnam made another large-scale attack into Thailand’ (U.S. Department of State, 2013, 
doc. 313).  China’s ultimate conditions for a political settlement, as articulated by Deng 
Xiaoping, were the genuine independence of Kampuchea and the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops from the country. Any political settlement departing from these two 
preconditions ‘is in fact aiding the Vietnamese and aiding the Russians…if we waiver on 
these two preconditions whatsoever, then the political settlement will not rid us of a 
Vietnam trying to form an Indochina Federation’ (U.S. Department of State, 2013, doc. 
265). 
Thailand’s Diplomatic Role 
Thailand also played an important diplomatic role for China.  In particular, it was 
able to act as a key link between the PRC and ASEAN (Chambers, 2005, p. 617).  In an 
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October 1980 visit to Beijing, Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda secured Chinese 
‘willingness to consider ASEAN’s proposal to create a coalition resistance government 
that would include non-communist forces as well as the Khmer Rouge’ (Chambers, 
2005, p. 618).  This was in part a response to negative international attention regarding 
Pol Pot’s brutal regime.  A tripartite resistance coalition was formed in June 1982.  It 
consisted of the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk; the former King of Cambodia who was 
ousted from power during a US backed coup in 1970, and Son Sann, a former 
Cambodian Prime Minister.   
The resistance coalition, named the Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea (CGDK), proved diplomatically successful, helping increase international 
support at the United Nations against the illegitimacy of the Vietnamese puppet regime 
in Cambodia (Simon, 1984, p. 525).  Thailand also sought to alleviate tensions between 
the PRC and ASEAN at a UN international conference in July 1981.  Thailand persuaded 
ASEAN countries to move closer to the Chinese position on the need for the Khmer 
Rouge (Chambers, 2005, p. 618).  It also strove to patch up misunderstandings between 
the two, and to alleviate lingering concerns regarding China’s true intentions 
(Chambers, 2005, pp. 618-619).   
Thailand as a Vanguard State 
As emphasized in the work of Crawford (2003, pp. 30-31) and Press (2005, pp. 
25-28), following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, security cooperation for the purpose 
of self-preservation was a vital interest for both Thailand and China.  Interest 
convergence between the two can be identified by the informal arrangement for 
cooperation that developed from 1979.  In order to contain the Vietnamese threat, 
China was able to use Thai territory to aid the Khmer Rouge.  In return, Thailand 
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received security guarantees that greatly enhanced Thai territorial integrity.  Whilst it is 
unclear whether Vietnam would have invaded Thailand, there existed a strong regional 
belief that Thailand could be the next domino to fall.  By obtaining great power security 
commitments, Thailand was able to resist any potential sovereignty violation from an 
aggressive Vietnam.  Thailand actively sought and supported great power intervention 
in regional affairs, which was consistent with the interests of both the ASEAN state and 
the external actor.  This satisfies all criteria of Thailand acting as a vanguard state.                   
ASEAN Institutional Cohesion (1978 – 1991) 
ASEAN Disunity 
Despite the release of joint ASEAN statements following Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia, the conflict did not automatically see an alignment of ASEAN state interests.  
Divisions within ASEAN ‘arose from a natural divergence of strategic perspectives’ 
(Leifer, 1989, p. 90), which were ‘located along a continuum whose extremes were 
marked by the positions of Thailand and Indonesia’ (Leifer, 1989, p. 92).  Indonesia and 
the Philippines indicated that ‘they did not consider that Vietnam posed any threat to 
ASEAN’ (Funston, 1979, p. 280).  Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, foresaw ‘the 
possibility of growing Chinese strength leading at best to increased great power rivalry 
in the region and at worst to the reassertion of Beijing’s hegemony’ (Simon, 1984, p. 
527).   
Indonesia, in particular, historically viewed China as ‘an aggressive and 
expansionist power’ (Sukma, 1999, p. 54).  However, Thailand and Singapore believed 
China could help maintain regional stability.  In the period following the Sino-
Vietnamese border war, China launched a major propaganda war directed at 
28 
 
neighbouring ASEAN countries.  Beijing committed to reduce aid to communist parties 
within Thailand and Malaysia to the lowest level in over twenty years (Simon, 1984, p. 
522).  Taking a strong stance in its fight against the Vietnamese, Singapore proposed 
military cooperation with external powers and called upon ASEAN to aid Khmer Rouge 
guerrillas in their fight at the borders (Buszynski, 1981, pp. 542-543).   
Enhanced ASEAN ‘Solidarity’ 
Thailand was dissatisfied with the level of support offered by the ASEAN states. 
It showed this dissatisfaction through local news reports, stating its concern ‘that other 
countries had not shown they were prepared to fully support Thailand in the event of an 
attack on it by Vietnam’ (Funston, 1979, p. 282).  Faced with a division in state interest, 
Thailand sought to push its own agenda within ASEAN.  Chinese support ‘was of signal 
relevance to the insistence by the Thai government that its regional partners stand up 
and be counted in a collective demonstration of ASEAN solidarity’ (Leifer, 1989, p. 96).  
As such, ASEAN was made ‘hostage to solidarity’ with Thailand (Leifer, 1989, p. 97).  
Thai efforts were aided by two events: a surge of refugees from Cambodia and Vietnam 
in April and May 1979, which threatened the internal stability of the ASEAN states, and 
a series of shallow Vietnamese raids and armed incursions against Khmer Rouge camps 
at the Thai border in 1979.  Under pressure from Thailand, the Association ‘closed ranks 
once more in support of the Association’s front-line state…from that point, ASEAN 
became more explicit in its challenge to Vietnam’ (Leifer, 1989, p. 108). 
As a response to these events, Malaysia cancelled aid and technological 
cooperation agreements with Vietnam, tripled the size of its air force and doubled the 
size of its army (Turley & Race, 1980, p. 109).  By May, the Malaysian Prime Minister 
had made a successful visit to China, indicating a shift away from Vietnam (Funston, 
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1979, p. 281). The Philippines announced a $200 million increase in its military budget 
and Indonesia ordered that 60 army battalions be brought to full strength (Turley & 
Race, 1980, p. 109).  Both Malaysia and Indonesia also promised to assist Thailand in 
case of a Vietnamese attack (Turley & Race, 1980, p. 108).  What form this aid would 
have taken is unclear.  In mid-March 1979, ASEAN as an entity secured the Non-Aligned 
Movement’s sponsorship for a draft resolution before the UN Security Council.  The 
Association lobbied the UN to prevent international recognition of the Vietnamese 
puppet regime in Cambodia, thus denying a Vietnamese fait accompli.  UN General 
Assembly resolutions on Cambodia sponsored by ASEAN were effectively handled by 
Singapore, which ‘came into its own’ in the period after the invasion (Leifer, 2000, p. 
84).  Singapore took the position that ‘if Democratic Kampuchea were to lose its seat in 
the United Nations, it would be tantamount to saying that it is permissible for a 
powerful military state to invade its weaker neighbour, to overthrow its government 
and to impose a puppet regime on it’ (Leifer, 2000, p. 86).     
Indonesia’s Diplomatic Initiatives 
Whilst Indonesia and Malaysia supported ASEAN’s position against Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia, they still believed that attempts should be made to reach a 
diplomatic compromise with Vietnam (Sukma, 1999, p. 95).  This was articulated in the 
March 1980 Kuantan principle.  Advocated by both states, it sought to reduce great 
power influence in the region and seek a regional solution to the conflict in Cambodia.  
At the heart of the proposal was the hope that ‘Vietnam would agree to cut its Soviet 
ties…if Thailand delinked from China and the Khmer Rouge’ (Simon, 1984, p. 528).  
However, the principle was never implemented, proving unpopular with Thailand, 
China and Vietnam (Buszynski, 1986, p. 224).  With tensions remaining between the 
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Indonesian and Thai approaches to Vietnam, Indonesia was given the role of ‘official 
ASEAN interlocutor’ with Vietnam (Ross, 1991, p. 1178).  Jakarta maintained this 
position throughout the crisis, making various attempts to engage Vietnam 
diplomatically.  For example, in 1988, Indonesia invited representatives from Hanoi, 
Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge and Prince Sihanouk to meet for discussions at a cocktail 
party in Jakarta, later titled the Jakarta Informal Meeting (Ross, 1991, p. 1178). 
Crucially, Indonesia’s diplomatic attempts never sought to obstruct ASEAN consensus 
over Cambodia (Ang, 2013).   
Amelioration of the Sino-Soviet Conflict 
 Despite ASEAN’s diplomatic role in the crisis, which certainly helped to frustrate 
Vietnamese and Soviet regional ambitions, ASEAN had very little impact on the eventual 
resolution of the conflict.  This is a fact acknowledged in 2011 by Wong Kan Seng, 
former Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for National 
Security.  According to Wong, ‘the Cambodian issue was essentially a Sino-Soviet proxy 
conflict.  This was clearly beyond the powers of Singapore or even ASEAN as a whole to 
resolve’ (Wong, 2011).  Indeed, the conflict only came to an end when Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev, seeking normalisation with China, realised that ‘ameliorating the 
Sino-Soviet conflict and disengaging China from the Western security system was a far 
more important objective than having good relations with Vietnam and significant 
influence in Indochina’ (Ross, 1991, p. 1174).  With a gradual reduction in Soviet 
economic and military aid, Vietnam found itself abandoned, and unable to support its 
wartime economic and military policy in Cambodia.  With little power to face Chinese 
aggression on its own, Vietnam withdrew all its troops from the territory, bringing an 
official end to the conflict on 23 October 1991.      
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Conclusion  
This article was prompted by dissatisfaction with the inadequate treatment of 
the Third Indochina War in the existing ASEAN literature. Within the constructivist 
literature, there is significant emphasis on ASEAN norm adherence and the 
development of a regional identity.  However, our analysis of the Third Indochina War 
illustrates that such analysis downplays the role of an external actor, China, in 
explaining the ASEAN states’ resistance to sovereignty violation.  A second approach 
advocated by Lee Jones focused solely on domestic factors, overlooking the critical role 
played by external factors including extra-regional actors, as well as ASEAN’s 
international security concerns. Finally, a third perspective associated with Michael 
Leifer, Michael LR Smith and David Jones takes an overly restrictive view of ASEAN 
autonomy in its analysis.  While their perspective is compelling at points, they under-
estimate ASEAN states’ ability to secure their interests and to engage in cooperation to 
defend them.  Despite deep divisions within ASEAN, the Association formed and 
maintained (admittedly, more robustly at some times than others) a united front in 
support of Thailand’s Vietnam policy.  
The primary purpose of this article is to construct an explanation, rooted in a 
theoretical perspective that can more convincingly explain the dynamics of ASEAN state 
resistance to sovereignty violation.  As has been described above, a realist external 
actor-ASEAN state interest convergence model is effective in explaining ASEAN’s 
resistance to sovereignty violation during the Third Indochina War. Interest 
convergence between Thailand and China regarding the Vietnamese threat meant that 
Thailand (and by extension ASEAN) was able to resist sovereignty violation from an 
expansionist Vietnam. Conversely, China was able to use Thailand, and by extension 
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ASEAN, to support its Vietnam policy in Southeast Asia.  Had it not been for the informal 
alliance with China, and to a lesser extent the US, it is highly likely that Thailand would 
have resigned itself to Vietnamese domination in Indochina.  ASEAN alone did not have 
the capabilities to reverse Vietnam’s Cambodia policy, or to stand against Vietnam if it 
had sought to expand into Thailand.  So, Singaporean diplomat Tommy Koh is half-right. 
ASEAN was an important component in the story.  But we would be only seeing half the 
story if we did not focus on China’s role, and the issue of external actor convergence 
emphasised in this article.       
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Notes 
1 For the purposes of this article, the Third Indochina War has also been referred to as the 
Cambodia conflict, the Second Indochina War has also been referred to as the Vietnam War, and 
Cambodia has also been referred to as Kampuchea. 
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